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Abstract
This paper presents a computer based simulation model which analyses the dynamics of public perceptions of risk using
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) ('mad cow disease') in the UK as a case study. The model is based upon a
theoretically-derived understanding of the concept of perception of risk, and employs Cultural Theory and the archetypes it
identiﬁes as distinctive forms of social organization and cultural bias in the formation of perceptions. Cultural Theory is used as
a theoretical lens for understanding the different interpretations of the risk associated with BSE/nvCJD, the subsequent risk
ampliﬁcation by the media, and the effect of trust and reliance in science and government in their construction. The analysis
helps achieve a better understanding of the dynamics of public perceptions of risk, and it is therefore of interest both for
academics and policy makers. In particular, the model allows exploring the inﬂuence that the occurrence of risk-related events,
their media coverage, and trust in government responses has in the process by which people construct their risk perceptions.
Keywords:
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 Introduction
1.1 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 'mad cow disease' was, arguably, the major risk issue of the
past several decades in the UK. The prion agent responsible for BSE is now understood to have jumped the species barrier and
to have resulted in a fatal condition in humans who were exposed to the infectious agent through handling diseased cattle or
eating contaminated animal products. This condition is known as new-variant Creutzfeld Jacob Disease (nvCJD). BSE/nvCJD
has been extensively studied by natural scientists, and the whole episode was thoroughly reviewed by the Phillips Enquiry, which
published a substantial report on BSE in 2000 (Phillips 2000). Social scientists have also taken a keen interest in the BSE saga
(van Zwanenburg and Millstone 2005; Miller 1999; Seguin 2000; Wynne 1996). This paper presents a computer-based social
simulation model (Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999; Hanneman and Patrick 1997; Klüver et al. 2003) to analyse the formation of public
perceptions of risk using the BSE episode as a case study. The model provides a quantitative operationalization of the multi-
dimensional concept of risk perception, and of the relevant variables and relationships that inﬂuence its emergence and
maintenance over time. Section 2 provides a justiﬁcation of a social simulation modeling approach to the issue of understanding
the dynamics of risk perceptions. The subsequent sections of the paper provide a description of the variables and structure of
the model along with an outline of the main conceptual hypotheses we have drawn upon in building it. Section 4 analyses the
dynamics of public perceptions of risk based on the results of selected simulations. Section 5 presents comparisons and
potential correspondence between available empirical data and the model's simulated trajectories. The paper ends with
conclusions and future lines of research.
Rationale for Using Social Simulation Modeling
2.1 Simulation modeling has recently become a major analytical tool for the study of dynamic systems in a wide range of disciplines
including the social sciences. A substantial number of researchers, concerned with both abstract theorizing and empirical
estimation, have adopted this formal methodology as an alternative to other more traditional analytical methods, which are
considered unable to provide satisfactory approaches for analyzing complex dynamics systems. In a complex setting,
mathematical analysis is generally limited in its ability to derive the system's dynamic characteristics, and simulation modeling is
one response to complexity (Hanneman and Patrick 1997; Nuno et al. 2005).
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one response to complexity (Hanneman and Patrick 1997; Nuno et al. 2005).
2.2 In this work we apply simulation modeling as a tool for theory building and development (Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999; Klüver et al.
2003; Ulrich and Troitzsch 2005; Smith and Conrey 2007), for the case of theoretical approaches to the formation of risk
perceptions. The application of this methodology for theory development implies the transformation of speciﬁc theoretical
approaches to social dynamics into a formal model. This requires a number of explicit choices about levels of analysis, dynamic
aspects to focus on, and the classiﬁcation of relevant parameters. By variation of these parameters within different scenarios it is
possible to investigate if the main elements of the theory (which is sometimes under-expressed in formal terms) can be
reproduced (Hanneman and Patrick 1997). In particular, simulation modeling permits two key theory developments: rigorous
testing, reﬁnement, and extension of existing theories that (given their complexity) have proven difﬁcult to formulate and evaluate
using standard statistical and mathematical tools; and a deeper understanding of fundamental mechanisms that underpin the
dynamics of the phenomenon that the theory is attempting to explain.
2.3 The transformation of the (usually informal) theory into a formal model demands an operationalisation and a higher level of
precision of the key premises and statements of the theory (Klüver et al. 2003); this may give new insights into the original
theory. The representation of a theory in informal language can hide inaccuracies and vagueness that become manifest only with
the construction of a formal model (Holland and Miller 1991).
2.4 As indicated, in this work we apply simulation modeling as a tool for theory development in understanding the formation of risk
perceptions. In particular, our model is a tool for the theoretical elaboration and integration of existing approaches, and is aimed at
operationalising/formalizing some of the most relevant theoretical concepts that currently exist in the literature of risk perceptions.
The model provides a conceptualisation and quantitative operationalisation of the dynamics of risk perception underpinned by a
solid theoretical framework based on well-established theories and a user-friendly analytical tool that can be employed as a
template to run simulations for many different theoretical scenarios.
2.5 Our focus on theory building comes at a cost, however, in particular related to the validation of the model against empirical data.
Validation of models of complex systems is problematic and despite numerous contributions on the subject, a common protocol
for the design and validation of simulation models has not yet emerged (Matteo et al. 2006; Fagiolo et al. 2007; Pyka and Fagiolo
2007; Safarzy&nacute;ska et al. 2010). This is partly due to the fact that there are usually no, or very little, data available for the
empirical validation and the calibration of the model. [1] Once a model has been built, the outputs can be used to test the
implications of the theory, rather than depict 'reality'. However, if the model has been constructed well, it allows researchers to
gain a more complete understanding of the theory's limitations and implications. In short, observation, insight, and prior work give
rise to a tentative theory that is stated quite formally and speciﬁcally in a model; and the model is used as a way of investigating
(logically deducing) the implications of the theory across a range of scenarios (Hanneman and Patrick 1997). The transformation
of an original theory into a model may show that the theory needs to be enlarged and corrected. In many cases, the theory
needs not only higher levels of precision but also extension at critical points. Clearly, if a theory can be transformed into a formal
model only by changing its key premise, it is likely that the original theory had little explanatory power (ibid, p.10). With these
advantages and limitations in mind, we turn now to describing a dynamical systems model of risk perceptions.
Description of the model
3.1 Constructing a model of the public perceptions of risk requires the adoption of a position vis-à-vis the vast literature on the origins
and maintenance of risk perceptions. The positions range from social constructionism through critical realist to positivist
approaches. Here we have employed Cultural Theory (CT) as developed by Douglas (1982), Douglas (1992), Douglas and
Wildavsky (1982), Thompson et al. (1990), Schwarz and Thompson (1990), Gross and Rayner (1985), and Rayner and Cantor
(1987) amongst others. Risk perception is deﬁned in this work as "the subjective assessment of the probability of a speciﬁed
type of accident happening and how concerned we are with the consequences" (Sjoberg et al. 2004, p. 8).[2]
3.2 Since we employ 'mad cow disease' in the UK as a case study and Cultural Theory as a theoretical framework, we have termed
our model COWCULT. In our view, CT constitutes a viable theoretical lens for understanding different interpretations of risk and
has already been used successfully in previous simulation exercises, e.g. in modeling public perceptions of climate change risks
(Janssen 2002; Janssen and de Vries 1998). Cultural theory is a form of 'constrained relativism', that is, it accepts the existence
of more than one interpretation of the 'same' evidence (including that from science), but does not entertain belief in a multiplicity of
interpretations speciﬁc to each new context. The way that evidence is arranged, selected and used by groups of individuals to
justify a position in CT is limited to four basic archetypes: hierarchy (H), individualism (I), egalitarianism (E) and fatalism (F) which
we have collectively termed Cultural Theory Archetypes (CTAs). The theory, however, also accounts for dynamic changes
between different CTAs.
3.3 This paper is not the place to defend CT or to enter a lengthy digression into its selection here. There are also several different
interpretations of CT, especially the extent to which perceptions and beliefs are closely or loosely related to the social context.
Mary Douglas regarded the social context and perceptions as being closely entwined, to the extent that she was skeptical of
their divorce. Many other writers in the tradition have allowed for their partial separation, however, and it is this strand of the
theory that we adopt here. A summary of the world views of the four CTAs is presented below.
Individualism puts emphasis upon the individual person as the appropriate unit of analysis and regards those individuals
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as inherently self-seeking and atomistic. Individualists are subject to minimal proscriptions and prescriptions and believe
in the operation of the 'invisible-hand'; the pursuit of self-interest within self-organizing networks (markets) is believed to
maximize social welfare. Individualism favours de-regulation, the freedom to take risks and to innovate and the preferred
learning style is trial-and-error. Nature is regarded as benign and forgiving, able to recover from disturbances and
disruptions.
Egalitarianism is communitarian, maintaining belief in equality and the right and responsibility of every member to
contribute to decision making. Humans are regarded as being essentially caring and sharing (until corrupted by coercive
and inegalitarian institutions: markets and hierarchies). Nature is perceived as being fragile, intricately interconnected
and ephemeral -readily perturbed by anthropogenic inﬂuences. The 'precautionary principle' is the favored heuristic for
making decisions under uncertainty.
Hierarchy is collective but embraces structure and stratiﬁcation—and often elaborate sets of prescriptions and
proscriptions by which to distinguish roles and hold people and organizations to account. Humans are malleable: often
deeply ﬂawed but redeemable by ﬁrm, long-lasting and trustworthy institutions. Nature is perceived as being stable until
pushed beyond discoverable limits—perverse (where poorly understood and managed) but tolerant (where the limits are
revealed (a role for certiﬁed experts) and acted-upon (the domain of technocrats)). Expert- and science-based
assessment and judgment in the context of statutory regulation is the preferred decision-making style.
Fatalism is a world of proscriptions and prescriptions but without a sense of agency or inﬂuence. Humans are perceived
as being ﬁckle and untrustworthy. Fairness, in consequence, is an unrealistic aspiration and there is no possibility of
effecting change for the better. Nature is regarded as being capricious and random—there is no discernible pattern in
how it responds to anthropogenic perturbations. The fatalist's world (unlike those of the other three CTAs) is one in which
learning is impossible. 'Why bother?' therefore, is the rational management response.
3.4 COWCULT, as a social simulation model, allows for the perception and construction of risk differently according to the internal
logic and predilections of each speciﬁc CTA. The CTAs do not refer to individual perceptions, but rather to social tendencies or
proclivities which emerge from reinforcing worldviews and social experience and context; hence the use of the term 'archetypes'.
While primarily based upon the theoretical assumptions of CT, COWCULT also draws upon psychometric and sociological
theories of risk, risk ampliﬁcation and trust. The model incorporates and formalizes the hypotheses postulated by these theories
with the aim of contributing to the development of a more-inclusive theoretical approach for the analysis of risk perceptions. The
model is a system dynamics model built using the software package Stella Version 7.[3] The process by which risk perceptions
develop and change is complex and not universally or reliably reducible to a small number of determinants. The literature
suggests that many factors inﬂuence perceptions, both positively and negatively, and that these factors are frequently interacting
with one another. As a result, the formation and evolution of risk perceptions is a suitable challenge for simulation modeling.
3.5 Our main objective is the construction of a robust simulation model which allows the testing out of the internal conceptual validity
of the aforementioned theories of risks. We employ CT as a theoretical lens for understanding the different interpretations that
cultural archetypes (individuals or collections of individuals) make of the risks they face. According to CT, agents or individuals
interpret events in a different manner depending on the cultural group or archetype to which they ascribe, lean or belong.
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Figure 1. Outline of the model
3.6 The model is composed by the following four sub-models—see Figure 1 for an overview of its general structure, and the steps
we have followed in its construction:
The Cultural Construction of Risk Sub-Model (Steps 1 to 4)
The Theory of Surprise Sub-Model: The Dynamics of Shifts between different Cultural Archetypes (Steps 1A to 4A, and 4
to 7)
The Risk Ampliﬁcation Sub-Model (Steps 7 to 10)
The Trust-Reliance Sub-Model (Steps 11 to 15)
The following sections provide an explanation of the way in which each sub-model has been built, as well as the main theoretical
hypotheses upon which their design is based.
The Cultural Construction of Risk Sub-Model
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3.7 The Cultural Construction of Risk sub-model operationalises the way in which different Cultural Theory Archetypes (CTAs)
construct their perceptions of risk when they face the occurrence of BSE related events. The model considers two types of
events: the number of cases of BSE, and the number of human deaths from nvCJD. We have employed actual empirical data as
the inputs to the variables BSE/nvCJD which calculates the accumulated number of cases of BSE (Bovine events empirical) and
of human deaths from nvCJD (Human deaths empirical) on a weekly basis over the time period July 1988 to March 2004 (see
Figure 2 for the Individualist CTA). Since the interpretation that each of the four CTAs makes of the accumulation of BSE and
nvCJD events over time is different, their inﬂuence on the construction of risk perceptions will also differ for each CTA. In order
to account for this effect, the model assigns different weights to the same number of accumulated events for each CTA. These
weights (BSE and nvCJD multipliers in Figure 2) represent the ﬁrst ﬁlter 'applied' by adherents (agents or individuals) to different
CTAs and therefore make different interpretations of the same evidence or facts.[4]
3.8 For instance, in the case of the egalitarians, the weight given to the number of accumulated BSE related events is the strongest
(the BSE multipliers takes a high value) since we have assumed that the death of animals is considered by the egalitarians as a
very signiﬁcant event (relative to its signiﬁcance to the other CTAs). Individualists, on the other hand, tend to value human life
above all else, and so their weighting of nvCJD deaths is the highest of all CTAs. Fatalists and hierarchists have been assigned
multipliers whose values are somewhere in between. The next step in developing the Cultural Construction of Risk Sub-Model
(Step 3 in Figure 1) has been to establish the key dimensions of the issues that affect the construction of perceived risks by
individuals. Drawing from the risk literature, in particular from the psychometric and sociological approaches (Adams 1995;
Krimsky and Golding 1992), the model incorporates seven dimensions of risk perceptions. These are perceptions of:
involuntariness (Slovic 2000), polluting nature (Douglas 1966), unfamiliarity (Slovic 2000), dreadness (Slovic 2000),
trustworthiness (Wynne 1987), vulnerability (Slovic 2000), and perceptions of fairness (Rayner and Cantor 1987).
Figure 2. BSE/nvCDJ accumulated events for the Individualist CTA
3.9 The perceptions of risk associated with the accumulated number of BSE related events (represented by the BSE event
convertor) are deﬁned by the variables Risk perceptions convertor for each CTA. These are scaled variables which take values
between 0 and 100 reﬂecting the different strengths or level of risk perceived by each CTA: the value 0 represents the case in
which individuals perceive the sustained occurrence of actual BSE related events as not entailing any risk, and the value 100
represents the case in which they perceive that this accumulation of events involves a highly signiﬁcant risk.[5] In order to
account for the multifaceted nature of the perceptions of risk, the Risk perceptions convertor for each CTA is calculated as a
function of the seven dimensions listed above (see Figure 3 for the case of the Individualist CTA). In particular, perceptions of
risk are computed as a weighted linear combination of the variables representing the key risk dimensions. The values assigned
to the weights differ for every CTA according to the relative importance each CTA places on each dimension when constructing
their perception of risk: each dimension contributes to a greater or a lesser extent to the increase (or maintenance) of the
perceptions depending on the speciﬁc characteristics of each CTA. (Table 1 provides an explanation of the way the weightings
for the different CTAs have been deﬁned).
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Figure 3. The Cultural Construction of Risk Sub-model for the Individualist CTA
Table 1: Weightings of the seven dimensions of risk for each CTA
Cultural Theory Archetypes
Individualists Egalitarians Hierarchists Fatalists
Rationale for
Weightings
Individualists
rely upon their
own sense of
trust in others,
hence weight
for
trustworthiness
is high. 
Individualists
believe that
equality of
opportunity is
vital, hence
fairness is also
highly weighted.
Egalitarians have a
strong concern about
potential risks and
hence tend to regard all
the 7 variables as
important. They rate
dreadness slightly
more since for them
nature is ephemeral,
and hence quite
unstable. Fairness is
also a very important
variable.
Hierarchists allocate
weightings fairly
evenly across the 7
variables, reﬂecting
their preference for
inclusion of many
dimensions in
decision making.
Trust is an important
attribute in this
archetype along with
reducing
vulnerability and
increasing equality.
Fatalists will be most
concerned about
fairness—they think
that they are always
on the receiving end
of risks. They also
regard themselves
as vulnerable to risks
being imposed upon
them. Of less
importance to
fatalists are
involuntariness
(rarely able to make
it otherwise), trust
(low in any case) and
polluting nature.
Involuntariness All decisions are
ultimately
voluntary
Government and
industry cannot be
trusted. In reality most
Provided reliable and
easy-to-understand
information is
Many decisions are
in reality involuntary,
but it is difﬁcult to say
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provided that
deliberate
falsehoods are
not purveyed.
decisions are
involuntary.
provided, decisions
are voluntary.
in advance which
ones!
Weighting 0.5 1 0.6 0.5
Polluting Nature Where there is
clear empirical
evidence of
genetic transfer
between
species, then
there is the
potential for
polluting nature.
But potential is
not the same as
'realised'.
We should assess
genetic pollution in
theoretical terms. A
potential risk should be
assumed to become a
realised risk due to
unexpected
contingencies. 
There is no single
answer as the risk
of genetic pollution
depends upon the
donor, host and the
vector, as well as
the speciﬁc
environmental
conditions. A case-
by-case analysis
and expert judgment
is required, probably
through an expert
committee. There is
a general preference
for 'eering' on the
side of caution.
Science is unlikely to
be able to tell us what
is and what is not
polluting. It's probably
more a case of 'ﬁnd
out and see'. There
will almost certainly
be some genetic
pollution, with
adverse effects to
human health,
though.
Weighting 1 1 0.6 0.2
Unfamiliarity The diseases
are variations
on well known
conditions (e.g.
scrapie). The
meat rendering
processes are
a modiﬁcation of
known
processes. We
should see BSE
and hvCJD as
only different in
degree from
those other
established
diseases.
BSE and hvCJD are
both qualitatively
different diseases and
infective agents from
any previous known. 
They are per se, highly
unfamiliar and should
be assessed and
regulated as such.
These are
qualitatively different
conditions from
those previously
experienced and
should be assessed
and regulated as
such. However, at
the beginning, it was
not possible to be
sure of the
qualitative difference
in character of the
conditions. It is easy
to be clear in
hindsight!
Risk is, by its nature,
about unfamiliarity
and uncertainty ... so
to try and 'tame' risk
is a fundamentally
mistaken notion. But
that doesn't mean
that all risks are
'bad', just that you
can't readily sort out
the good and bad.
Weighting 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7
Dreadness A lot of
exaggeration
has been going
on, e.g.
concerning the
thousands who
might die from
hvCJD. It's not
very likely to
happen. A
'moral panic'
has emerged.
This is a highly
dreaded set of
diseases and
conditions—for good
reasons. Things could
be really bad according
to the high projections
of deaths—which
estimates are just as
valid as other lower
estimates.
A sense of
proportion about the
risks must be kept-
whilst recognising
the existence of
some pretty scary
possibilities which
are only at present
not realised. Is the
number who might
die from hvCJD in
the tens to hundreds
range or in the tens
to hundreds of
thousands range?
Things could be
really bad, but we
don't really know.
There may be a lot of
scaremongering
going on so until the
deaths start
mounting up perhaps
the best course of
action is to be stoic
and 'wait and see'
what unfolds.
Weighting 0.4 1.25 0.5 1.7
Trustworthiness
of Government
Institutions
In the end, risk
is a subjective
experience so it
is always better
to trust yourself.
You can decide
for yourself who
you do and
don't believe.
Government
regulators end
up like the
'nanny state'
and overly
conservative,
even if well
meaning.
Governments are
generally captured by
dominant economic
interests—in this case
the meat industry,
agriculture, etc. Only
with the utmost
scrutiny and
transparency can
government agencies
be made to be
trustworthy. The record
of BSE demonstrates a
high level of capture,
which had to be
reigned in following the
scale of the disaster
which unfolded.
A proper risk
assessment and
regulatory control
system are
absolutely essential
to trustworthiness.
This was initially
absent but was
created to a very
high standard as the
crisis developed.
It's impossible to
know who to trust in
advance since the
actual incidence of
risk cannot be
accurately
determined in
advance. However,
the government did
seem to be
particularly lacking in
the earlier stages of
the BSE crisis—there
is not really much
reason for trusting
governments any
more now.
Weighting 2.15 1 1.8 0.3
Vulnerability Vulnerability is
ultimately a
subjective
experience—it
should be left to
the individual to
decide on their
There are highly
vulnerable groups
when it comes to BSE.
This is a result of the
uneven distribution of
information, education
and engagement.
One of the functions
of government is to
look after the
vulnerable in
society...There are
reasons why
differences in
Vulnerability occurs
but it can hit any one
any time—almost like
a random process.
So, it's a bit like being
hit by lightening—it's
not very nice if it
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own 'comfort
level'. We all
have the ability
to use
information to
assess whether
we wish to take
a risk or not
given our own
subjective
vulnerability.
Some groups cannot
afford to change their
eating behaviours or
are unable to do so for
socio-cultural reasons.
vulnerability occur
and we should
respond to these
differences through
education,
information
campaigns,
selective marketing,
etc.
happens to you but
there is not much
you can do to
prepare yourself for
it. In that sense we're
all vulnerable
whether we feel it or
not.
Weighting 0.2 1 1.5 1.8
Fairness The focus is on
the fairness of
opportunity, not
of outcome.
Initially
government
information was
so poor that
only those
scientiﬁcally
educated might
have
questioned the
advice—so it
was not fair.
We should focus upon
the fairness of
outcome, not of
opportunity. As
explained above, there
were qualitative
differences in
vulnerability which
resulted in reduction in
fairness.
Some unfairness is
an inevitable
consequence of
difference in society.
Initially poor
information might
have disadvantaged
some groups in
society more than
other to begin with
however. This
disparity was
subsequently
corrected.
Unfairness is just a
feature of daily life
—there is no point in
treating unfairness
about BSE any
differently from other
types of unfairness
and no reason to
imagine that
regulatory changes
will really make
eventual outcomes
any more fair.
Weighting 2.15 1.25 1.5 1.8
3.10 While precise numbers are used in these weightings, they are merely illustrative, based upon our own judgment, and are not
founded upon empirical data. Other weightings would of course be chosen by others; the model outputs are a demonstration of
the method, not as yet the output from a calibrated model. It is easy for the model-user to change the weightings, however, and
empirical data could be collected on the appropriate weightings to use through a survey, focus groups or interviews. This is one
necessary next-step in the model development process.
3.11 The values of the parameters and weights in the model have been assigned as the result of the veriﬁcation of the model or its
'internal validation' by performing a sensitivity analysis. Verifying a model entails testing that the dynamic processes it represents
behave as expected. This veriﬁcation process is often referred to as internal validation (or inner validity). Veriﬁcation serves the
purpose of generating a model of sufﬁcient quality and completeness and of minimizing errors, oversights, bugs and mistakes in
its implementation (Macal 2005). To verify or achieve inner validity in a model is harder than it might seem (Longley et al. 2009).
One way of doing this is through sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis is the study of how the variation in the output of the
model can be apportioned, qualitatively or quantitatively, to different sources of variation in the input of the model. Or in other
words, it is a technique for systematically changing the values of the parameters in a model to determine the effects of such
changes (Saltelli et al. 2004). In this way, theoretical hypotheses about the model's output can be tested under a range of
different input parameter settings. Usually the model is examined under several cases including extreme situations in which the
outcomes are 'easily' predictable. If the theory is well formulated and conceptually coherent these hypotheses should yield
expected results from the model, since they are based on the conceptual model design (Longley et al. 2009).
3.12 The variables representing the dimensions of risk perceptions are again scaled variables which grow in value (from 0 to 100) as
the number of accumulated BSE related events (as previously deﬁned) increases over certain thresholds. These thresholds also
take different values for each CTA to account for the fact that each dimension will contribute to an increase of the perceptions of
risk only when the accumulated number of BSE events reaches a certain (signiﬁcant) magnitude—which will be different for each
CTA. For example, the threshold corresponding to the vulnerability variable in the Individualist CTA is set at a much higher level
than for the other CTAs. The Individualsist perception of vulnerability will only increase to any great extent when a very signiﬁcant
number of BSE related events take place over a sustained period of time.
The Theory of Surprise Sub-Model: The Dynamics of Shifts between different CTAs
3.13 In order to take into account the dynamic aspects of Cultural Theory (CT) the model incorporates both population growth and
changes in the population structure/composition, i.e. the possibility that individuals move between different CTAs as a result of a
change in their world views (Thompson et al. 1990; Janssen 1998). The Theory of Surprise within CT provides an explanation of
the way in which the change in the composition of the population takes place. In CT surprise occurs in a CTA when the
expectations of its adherents are thwarted. The greater expectations are thwarted and the longer the period of time over which
this happens, then the greater the level of surprise. Surprise for a particular agent can be broadly deﬁned as the difference
between what he/she expects and what actually occurs. The occurrence of overwhelming evidence which an individual
perceives as contradicting the particular view he/she holds of a certain issue, would come as a surprise and challenge her/his
initial opinion. That individual would, as a consequence, decide that their view is in fact wrong, and therefore change it. If the
magnitude of the surprise is large and sustained enough in a CTA, there will be an exodus of followers of this CTA towards a
different one which appears better able to explain 'the facts'. In addition, CT posits that if evidence is perceived as being 'worse'
than anticipated/expected, then there should be a shift from more risk-taking to more risk-averse CTAs—from Individualist to
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Egalitarian for instance.
3.14 We have operationalised the Theory of Surprise into COWCULT as follows (see ﬁgs. 4 and 5). For each CTA we have
distinguished between perceived anticipated risk -deﬁned by the variable risk perception expected, and 'actual' perceived risk
—the risk perceptions output calculated by the model.[6] Expected perceptions of risks have been deﬁned as the trajectory of
actual BSE/nvCJD events (BSE events convertor) delayed by a time period starting in July 1988 and modiﬁed accordingly to
each CTA. Differences between expected and perceived risks are computed by the variable Gap convertor which represents
the magnitude of the 'surprise' for each CTA. Changes from one CTA to another will occur—in the fashion explained above—only
when the value of accumulated differences (gaps) over time is high enough—over a certain threshold—and over a period of time
long enough to challenge current views or perceptions. The thresholds over which dynamic movements among different CTAs
are produced are deﬁned in the model through the Gap threshold variables, whose values will again depend on the speciﬁc
characteristics of each CTA.
Figure 4. The Theory of Surprise Sub-Model for the Individualist CTA
3.15 The computation of the variables and dynamic relationships described above yield the time trajectories of the perceptions of risk
associated to BSE for each CTA incorporating both population growth and changes in the composition of the population ('CTA risk
perceptions' in Figure 1).
Figure 5. Dynamic Cultural Theory Archetypes
The Risk Ampliﬁcation Sub-Model
3.16 The Risk Ampliﬁcation Sub-Model operationalises social ampliﬁcation effects on the perception of risks previously calculated by
the sub-models outlined above. The social ampliﬁcation of risk is a well known and described phenomenon in the literature—see
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for instance (Pidgeon et al. 2003; Kasperson 1996; Kasperson and Kasperson 1996; Breakwell and Barnett 2001). Our model
considers two types of risk ampliﬁcation: through the effect of the media, and through the inﬂuence of other types of social
interaction/communication.
3.17 To operationalise the effect of the media we employed records of news articles mentioning BSE in the 815 week period between
1st July 1988 and March 31st 2004. We have developed our own data record using the electronic data base Infotrac. From the
start of 1996 to March 2004, we considered articles with mentions of BSE and nvCJD on a weekly basis from the following
newspapers: Daily Telegraph, Guardian, Times, Financial Times, Independent, Observer, Sunday Times and Sunday Telegraph,
i.e. all the quality broadsheet newspapers in the UK. For the 1988-1995 period we have used the time series provided by Miller's
(1999) study. All relevant articles have been classiﬁed into three categories—based upon the headline and ﬁrst few sentences of
each article: 'Likely to heighten risk perceptions', 'Likely to dampen risk perceptions', and 'Effect Unknown'. These have been
computed in the model through the variables media reports amplifying and media reports dampening (see Figure 6). The 1996-
2004 record shows an approximately 80/20% split between the 'heightening' and 'dampening' effects, and the 'unknowns' have
been allocated to the 'heightening' or 'dampening' category on a 70/30 % basis. The 80/20% split has also been applied to the
1988-1995 media record. The accumulated number of news articles over time is computed in the model for each CTA by the
variables Media reports effect (see Figure 6). For quantifying the amplifying net effect that the accumulation of media events has
on the perceptions of risks we have considered that their inﬂuence remains in the memory of individuals during a certain period
of time which will differ for each CTA. We have assumed that the Individualists and Fatalists remember media coverage for two
weeks only (i.e. they have a shorter term memory of events), whilst Hierarchists and Egalitarians remember media coverage for
four and eight weeks respectively. The magnitude of the net effect of the media on perceptions (the value of the Media ampliﬁer
indicator, in Figure 6) is also different for each CTA. For the Individualist CTA, high media coverage (i.e. a considerable
accumulation of news articles over time) reinforces perceptions of risk only moderately since Individualists, although open to the
direction of popular opinion, tend to be suspicious of information from the media and prefer to rely upon their own evidence and
experience. Hierarchists have the highest overall level of ampliﬁcation: hierarchical institutions take seriously how they are
presented in public (as witnessed by government attempts to 'spin' the media, etc.) hence their perceptions of risks will be highly
inﬂuenced by media coverage. The magnitude of the ampliﬁcation is quite responsive to reductions in media coverage but levels-
off at higher levels due to a saturation effect. Egalitarians will tend to be somewhat more wary of the media than Hierarchists,
whilst for the Fatalists risk perceptions are not reinforced in a continuous and/or coherent way since they generally have an
ambiguous response to increases in media coverage.
Figure 6. The Ampliﬁcation of Risk Sub-model for the Individualist CTA
3.18 As we have indicated, the social ampliﬁcation of perceived risk can take place not only via the media but through other forms of
social communication and interaction such as the ofﬁcial public communication of new scientiﬁc discoveries, and/or the
communication of facts in the social networks within which individuals interact. There is no single empirical data base on this type
of social effect available to us in the way that there is for the media record. Thus, in order to quantify this effect, we have used
signiﬁcant announcements and happenings in the BSE/nvCJD story on a year by year basis as a proxy variable (Signiﬁcant
events reported variable in Figure 6). In particular, we have consulted publications and reviews of BSE/nvCJD in each year, and
assigned them a level of signiﬁcance depending on the extent to which we consider that these events have led to a degree of
risk ampliﬁcation (Penningon 2000).
3.19 The computation of the variables and dynamic relationships described above yield the time trajectories of the perceptions of risk
associated with BSE for each CTA incorporating the amplifying effects derived from media coverage and the communication of
signiﬁcant related events ('Ampliﬁed CTA risk perceptions' in Figure 1).
The Reliance-Trust Sub-Model: The Information Deﬁcit and Technical Alienation Hypotheses
3.20 The Reliance-Trust Sub-Model operationalises the inﬂuence that the level of trust/distrust that different CTAs have regarding
government evaluations of risk—including the use of the scientiﬁc and technological foundations of these assessments- has in
the formation of risk perceptions. The motivation behind this sub-model arises from a debate in the sociology of science for policy
literature that has been on-going for 15 years or so (Irwin and Michael 2003; Adams and Thompson 2002). The starting point for
the debate is the so-called 'Information Deﬁcit' model of public (mis)understanding of science. This model maintains that peoples
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'over-reaction' or distrust of public presentations of science and technical risks is a consequence of a lack of proper information.
Hence, it is assumed that providing authoritative information to 'ﬁll in the gaps' or to correct falsehoods will diminish risk
perceptions. The information deﬁcit model is itself premised upon a misunderstanding of public understanding and, to some
extent, of the character of scientiﬁc knowledge itself (Irwin and Wynne 1996). As Wynne (1996) points out, people might well
have very legitimate reasons for distrusting public presentations of science and risks, and that this is fundamentally not to do with
lack of information or factual inaccuracies upon their part.
3.21 In this line of thought, Wynne has proposed an alternative to the information deﬁcit model regarding the inﬂuence of more
scientiﬁc information upon the public's perceptions which is diametrically the opposite in its assumptions (Wynne 1987; Otway
and Wynne 1989). According to this alternative approach, which we have termed the 'Technical alienation' hypothesis,
governments faced with a skeptical 'misinformed', distrusting public will proceed to try and convince the latter through provision
of ever more scientiﬁc and technical information, believing that the public will eventually be 'won-over' by the sheer weight of
irrefutable scientiﬁc argumentation placed before them. Yet, the more that scientiﬁc and technical information is provided, the
greater is the tendency of the public to become 'alienated' from such technical discourses, and to distrust formal risk
assessments even more. In other words, rather than alleviating and reducing concerns about risks, in Wynne's view, provision of
more technical information actually increases distrust in the process of risk assessment, and hence reinforces people
perceptions of risk.
3.22 The 'information deﬁcit' hypothesis reﬂects the way that Hierarchists typically think about risk and uncertainty while the 'technical
alienation' hypothesis, on the other hand, reﬂects the way that Egalitarians typically think about risk and uncertainty. However,
COWCULT includes the two types of effects in every CTA since in our view both hypotheses may have a degree of validity
during certain periods of time and situations. In particular, we have assumed that the information deﬁcit hypothesis will operate in
a CTA in those situations in which the level of trust in government and science is relatively high, while the technical alienation
hypothesis will operate in those periods characterised by a low level of trust, or when there is a high level of distrust in the
government and scientiﬁc institutions on the part of a CTA.
3.23 The 'information deﬁcit' hypothesis is operationalised in the model as a negative feedback in the dynamics of the perceptions of
risk (see Figure 7). We start with the assumption that perceptions of risk have an inﬂuence on the level of trust/distrust that each
CTA has in government pronouncements, systems and institutions and that the higher the perceptions of risks, the higher the
level of distrust will be. This seems to us a reasonable assumption since in general the government tends to be blamed for the
occurrence of risks, and, after all, it is assumed that government should take responsibility for controlling and managing risks to
the public. An increase in the level of public risk perceptions at a given time will trigger actions on the part of the government
which in general will be driven by its reliance on available scientiﬁc and technological (S&T) information. [7] These actions are
aimed at increasing the amount of S&T information given to the public in the next time period in an attempt to reduce their
perceptions of risk. Under the operation of the information deﬁcit hypothesis this increase in S&T information subsequently will
cause a reduction in people's initial distrust, and thus a dampening in the initially increased perceptions of risk. This effect is
computed in the model through the variable trust damp effect (see Figure 7). The 'technical alienation' hypothesis is
operationalized in the model as a positive feedback in the dynamics of the perception of risk. In this case, government actions
aimed at increasing public S&T information as a response to increases in the level of risk perceptions have an opposite effect
causing an increase in people's initial distrust, and giving rise to a reinforcement or ampliﬁcation in the perceptions of risk. This
effect is computed in the model through the variable trust amplif effect (see Figure 7).
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/15/2/2.html 11 31/03/2012
Figure 7. The Trust-Reliance Sub-model for the Individualist CTA
3.24 The computation of the variables and dynamic relationships described above yield the time trajectories of the perceptions of risk
associated with BSE for each CTA, or more speciﬁcally for each representative individual (or agent) belonging to a particular
CTA. Each of these trajectories—'Final CTA risk perceptions' in Figure 1—incorporates the amplifying/dampening effects caused
by the media/reported events, as well as the amplifying/dampening effects due to the different levels of distrust/trust that the
public has in government pronouncements, systems and institutions. The contribution of each CTA as a whole (i.e. that of all the
individuals in it) to the constructed collective perceptions of risk is calculated by multiplying the level of risk perceptions of each
representative individual by the proportion of individuals in the population that belong to that CTA.[8] The perceptions of risk for
the whole UK population—Collective ﬁnal risk perceptions- are calculated as the sum of the four CTAs contributions to risk.
These constitute the ﬁnal aggregated output of the model.
Simulation results and discussion
4.1 The simulated dynamic trajectories of risk perceptions constitute predictions on the basis of theories of risk perceptions. These
theories, as formalized by the model, will need empirical validation once the appropriate data on perceptions of risk are available.
Empirical validation (or calibration) normally requires the gathering of data on the dynamic processes that the simulation model
aims to represent: does the simulation match relevant real-world data?
4.2 In general, the level of anticipated correspondence between model outputs and empirical data depends to a great extent on the
purpose of the model—and hence on the model speciﬁcation and structure as dictated by the theories and hypotheses employed
in its construction. Generally, in the modeling of complex social processes, such as the formation of risk perceptions, the
richness of the theoretical approaches required to adequately formalize dynamic processes makes a simple approach to
empirical validation extremely difﬁcult. As already noted, establishing the internal validity of a model (its logic and consistency) is
of paramount importance. Before calibrating a model, it is ﬁrst necessary to check its inner validity or to verify it. During the
veriﬁcation step, that the model produces outputs which behave as postulated by the theory is checked. The simulation results
of the COWCULT model allows us to explore the dynamics of the perceptions of risks of BSE in the UK based upon the
hypothesized cultural archetypes deduced from Cultural Theory. The simulations have been run for a period of approximately 16
years (1988-2004). We have employed the following data inputs for the simulations runs: number of BSE incidents, number of
deaths from nvCJD, amount of public money spent on R&D, number of media articles on a weekly basis, and signiﬁcant events
reported on a yearly basis. Their time series are shown in Figures 8 and 9. As time trajectory 2 (black line) in Figure 8 shows, the
number of BSE events increased rapidly from 1988 to 1993 to decay gradually in the following years of the simulation period. The
number of nvCJD deaths (white line in Figure 8) [9] increased around late 1995, and as in the case of BSE events, tailed off
afterwards continuing in this fashion until 2004. The number of media reports is represented in Figure 9 with the time trajectory 1
in white corresponding to the number of reports including the media dampening effect calculated as previously explained; and
time trajectory 2 in pink corresponding to the number of reports including the media amplifying effect.[10]
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Figure 8. Empirical data on nCJD events and BSE events
4.3 The dynamics of these two variables show four distinctive peaks: in spring 1990 (the ﬁrst BSE scare), in late 1995, in March
1996, and at the time that the Phillips enquiry reported in November 2000. The variability of the media record post 1996 is due to
the availability of more detailed media records from that time onwards. The value of reported signiﬁcant media events (series 1 in
black color in Figure 9) reaches a peak in 1996 and then drops quite rapidly post 1997 due to the election of a new Labour
Government, which, having been out power for 18 years, was regarded as not to blame for the BSE debacle. It is interesting to
note that the increase in the number of amplifying media reports, and of signiﬁcant events, occur predominately after the rapid
growth in BSE cases. Except for the 1990 BSE scare in the media, it was not until the number of BSE events had started tumbling
downwards that media interest resumed. The continued media coverage post March 1996, albeit at a lower level, suggests that
human deaths from nvCJD constituted a highly important inﬂuence.
Figure 9. Media reports and signiﬁcant events reported
Figure 9 Media reports and signiﬁcant events reported
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4.4 Simulations of the model show the following results on the dynamics of risk perceptions of BSE, and their associated ampliﬁcation
effects. The trajectories of risk perceptions for each of the CTAs considered in our study are portrayed in Figures 10-13. Figure
10 shows the simulation results for the Individualist CTA. Trajectory 1 in orange in this ﬁgure corresponds to the perceptions of
risks associated exclusively with the occurrence of BSE events (i.e. without considering any amplifying or dampening effects
from the media and communication of events, and/or trust reliance issues). As can be seen in the ﬁgure, initial risk perceptions
for the individualist remain at a low level (with a maximum value of 22 on our scale of 0 to 100) and show little variation during the
whole simulation period. Trajectory 2 in white illustrates the effect of adding risk ampliﬁcation from media coverage and the
occurrence of ofﬁcial announcements and signiﬁcant events. This effect leads to a general increase in the perceptions of risk;
however they still remain at a relatively low level (with maximum levels taking values now around 50). There are three noticeable
peaks in the ampliﬁed trajectories in which perceptions are respectively three, four and seven times higher than their initial 'non-
ampliﬁed' values.
Figure 10. Perceptions of Risk for the Individualist CTA
4.5 These peaks are: (i) March 1996 due to the government announcement of a possible BSE—nvCJD link. The high value of risk
perceptions during this time period is driven mostly by the inﬂuence of the media and the reporting/communication of signiﬁcant
events effect; (ii) late 1998 due to an increase in reported nvCJD cases though the level of media coverage does not change
signiﬁcantly (compare with Figure 8); and (iii) late 2000 with the release of the Phillips Enquiry. Lord Phillips' enquiry led to
extensive media coverage mostly critical of the government's handling of the BSE affair. There were also at this time more
nvCJD cases, which account for at least some of the magnitude of the ampliﬁcation, and show the relatively higher importance
that the individualist CTA gives to the occurrence of nvCJD cases in relation to other inﬂuences. The white trajectory labeled 3 in
Figure 10 shows the ﬁnal trajectory of risk perceptions for the Individualist CTA, i.e. the resultant perceptions after including the
amplifying effect of distrust/trust in government and associated reliance on science. As the ﬁgure illustrates, the trust-reliance
effect only gives rise to risk perceptions ampliﬁcations (there is no dampening effects in this CTA) which do not reach a
signiﬁcant magnitude throughout the simulation period—there is only one noticeable peak in its trajectory at late 2000 after the
release of the Phillips Enquiry. This shows the modest inﬂuence that the trustworthiness of government institutions and science
has upon the risk perceptions formation of the Individualist CTA. For the individualist, risk is after all a subjective experience thus
it is always better to trust oneself and decide what constitutes a risk and what does not. The low values of perceptions shown at
the last stages of the simulation period are most likely due to the lack of related news or government action during those years in
which media (and most likely people) lost interest in the issue, and at which time the crisis was perceived as 'under control'
despite the fact that BSE and nvCJD cases were still occurring.
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Figure 11. Perceptions of Risk for the Hierarchist CTA
4.6 The Hierarchist CTA shows higher general levels of risk perceptions than the Individualist reaching maximum values around 34
(see trajectory 1 in orange in Figure 11). The magnitude of the amplifying media effect is also greater in this CTA (black trajectory
2 in the same ﬁgure), and starts to inﬂuence perceptions in a signiﬁcant way at a much earlier stage than for the Individualist. As
the ﬁgure shows there are three peaks in the media effect ampliﬁed trajectories—during these periods, perceptions of risks are
ten, and even sixteen, times higher than their initial non-ampliﬁed levels: (i) late 1992 to mid 1994 -a consequence of the social
communication of signiﬁcant events and (to a lesser extent) the media; (ii) the nvCJD cases increase peak (end of 1998 / early
1999); and (iii) the Phillips report peak in late 2000. The 1992 to 1994 ampliﬁcation seems to be particularly pronounced for the
Hierarchists because of the relatively higher importance that this CTA gives to the announcements of the occurrence of
signiﬁcant events in comparison with the other CTAs. The white line 3 in Figure 11 shows the ﬁnal trajectory with the trust-
reliance effect on ampliﬁed risk perceptions for the hierarchists. The dynamics of the trust-reliance ampliﬁcation effect is
particularly interesting for the Hierarchist CTA. Indeed, it is in this CTA in which the dynamic interaction of the positive and
negative feedbacks—as explained in the previous sections—and its inﬂuence in the formation of risk perceptions, is more clearly
appreciated. As can be seen in Figure 11, during the ﬁrst stages of the simulation (years 1988- 1991), the dynamics are
characterized by a decreasing perception of risk- ﬁnal risk perceptions are below the previously ampliﬁed risk perceptions. This
signiﬁcant reduction is the result of the dampening effect derived from the operation of the deﬁcit information hypothesis
(negative feedback), the magnitude of which is in this case greater than that of the technical alienation hypothesis (positive
feedback). During this period, the Hierarchists trust government reliance on science to deal with the situation despite the current
state of affairs, i.e. high number of BSE and nvCJD cases and the media coverage. After this initial period, the dampening effect
gets gradually reduced (with the consequent increase in the level of risk perceptions) as a result of an increase in the magnitude
of the positive feedback which now is higher than the negative one, until around middle 1992 when the dampening effect
disappears and is replaced by an amplifying effect which lasts until 1996. From middle 1992 to middle 1993 the magnitude of this
amplifying effect is fairly small: its value is reduced since the level of trust in government responses is still high enough for the
information deﬁcit (negative feedback) to operate. As trust is reduced, and the number of BSE cases grows, the ampliﬁcation
gradually increases reaching high values (maximum) during the end of 1993 and 1994. It is in this period where the effect of the
technical alienation hypothesis (reinforcing positive feedback) is at its strongest. From 1995 the ampliﬁcation decreases
(Hierarchists trust regrows as a result of government responses, and the information deﬁcit hypothesis kicks-in once again) to
give place to a modest dampening effect which will be maintained until the end of the simulation period, with the exception of two
peaks in 1997/8 and 2001 in which the reduction in the level of risk perceptions is higher due to the election of a new Labour
Government, and the release of the Phillips report. In summary, the signiﬁcant dampening in the perceptions of risks of the
Hierarchist CTA along with the reduction in initial ampliﬁcations during the aforementioned periods, are due to the relatively higher
level of trust that the Hierarchist CTA has in the responses of science and government institutions. Indeed, according to the
Hierarchist CTA, a proper risk assessment and regulatory control system are essential to trustworthiness, and although this was
initially absent (during the ﬁrst phases of the simulation), it was created by the institutional system to a high standard as the crisis
developed.
4.7 The risk perceptions for the Egalitarian CTA are shown in Figure 12. As the ﬁgure illustrates, without any ampliﬁcation effects, the
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perceptions of risk of the egalitarians (line 1 in orange in the ﬁgure) are signiﬁcantly stronger than those for the Individualist and
Hierarchist CTAs, reaching much higher levels throughout the whole simulation period—a maximum value of 99 in our scale of 0-
100. The magnitude of the amplifying media effect is quite signiﬁcant in this CTA (black trajectory 2 in the same ﬁgure), being
greater than the Individualist but lower than that of the Hierarchist CTA. (The perceptions of risks are ﬁve to ten times higher than
their initial non-ampliﬁed levels). The emergence of a 'split' peak prior to the 1996 announcement reﬂects intensive media
speculation on the BSE-CJD connection in late summer/autumn 1995. The split is also present for the Individualists, Hierarchists
and Fatalists but is much more pronounced for the Egalitarians than for the other CTAs because of the strong amplifying
inﬂuence of adverse media reports in the Egalitarian CTA. There is, furthermore, a slowing down of the inﬂuence of media reports
upon the Egalitarians' risk perceptions at high levels, which explains why the split peaks are approximately equal in size. The
relative size of the peaks for the Egalitarians is broadly similar to those for the Hierarchists, i.e. with the largest peak occurring
during the build-up of BSE cases in 1992-4, followed by the 1996 announcement and then by the release of the Phillips report.
Figure 12. Perceptions of Risk for the Egalitarian CTA
4.8 The inﬂuence of the trust-reliance effect is highly signiﬁcant for the Egalitarian CTA (white trajectory 3 in Figure 12) causing only
ampliﬁcation of risk perceptions during the whole simulation period. Again the magnitude of this ampliﬁcation will vary depending
on the values of the positive and negative feedbacks of trust and reliance on the perceptions of risk. As can be seen in the ﬁgure,
the inﬂuence of the positive feedback in the dynamics of perceptions—the effect of the technical alienation hypothesis—is
particularly strong, i.e. risk perceptions are signiﬁcantly reinforced as a result of the growing distrust in government actions and
responses characteristic of the Egalitarian CTA. Although the ampliﬁcation arising from the trust-reliance effect occurs across the
whole simulation period, its magnitude reaches fairly high values during the following four periods: the general build-up of BSE
cases between 1992 and 1994; the March 1996 announcement; the increase in nvCJD cases in late 1998; and the release of the
Phillips Report.
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Figure 13. Perceptions of Risk for the Fatalist CTA
4.9 The perceptions of risk of the Fatalist CTA are illustrated in Figure 13. The level of risk perceptions for this CTA without any
ampliﬁcation effects (orange trajectory 1 in the ﬁgure) are signiﬁcantly higher than those for the Individualist and Hierarchist
CTAs keeping a fairly constant high magnitude over the simulation period (around 80) and reaching a maximum value of 94 in our
scale of 0-100. The characteristics of the Fatalist CTA give rise to more random responses to events, and thus to a high
variability in the magnitude of both the media and trust amplifying effects (see trajectories 2 and 3 in Figure 13). The Fatalist
response shows a much less obvious pattern in comparison with the other three CTAs, although some of the peaks previously
identiﬁed are discernible (e.g. autumn 1995, March 1996), and the level of risk perception also decreases towards the end of the
simulation. In particular, compared to the other CTAs, the Fatalist CTA is relatively insensitive to the reduction in BSE cases and
to changes in media coverage. The highly signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the trust-reliance amplifying effect, on the other hand, is due to
its general lack of trust in science and government actions.
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Figure 14. Collective Perceptions of Risk
4.10 As we have indicated in the previous section, we have assumed that the four CTAs represent the full range of, and balance
between, the perceptions of risk for all the UK population, and so we have deﬁned the collective perceptions of risk as the sum of
the CTAs risk perceptions weighted by the proportion of individuals within the population belonging to each CTA. The trajectories
of the collective perceptions of risk are shown in Figure 14. Changes in the composition of the population due to the movements
of people between CTAs over time is illustrated in Figure 15 which shows the dynamics of the CTAs population proportions over
the whole simulation period. As Figure 14 shows, collective perceptions of risk follow most closely those of the Egalitarian and
Fatalist CTAs. In Figure 15, it can be observed that during the ﬁrst stages of the simulation the proportion of Egalitarians and
Fatalists increase rapidly: the accumulation of 'surprises', i.e. expectations not being fulﬁlled by the corresponding perceptions of
risk, shifts adherents away from the Hierarchists and Individualists CTAs, whose proportions therefore decline (especially the
Individualists). As the Individualists and Hierarchists adjust their expectations, their proportions begin to recover. Meanwhile, the
proportions of the Egalitarians and Fatalists begin to decrease as the level of surprise experienced by adherents to Individualist
and Hierarchist CTAs falls. With the onset of more nvCJD cases in 1997 onwards, the proportion of Individualists once again falls
since this level was not expected by the Individualist CTA, though it was more or less as anticipated by the Hierarchists. There is
a corresponding small increase once again in the proportions of Egalitarians and Fatalists, until the Individualists once again
readjust their expectations and their proportion begins to recover.
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Figure 15. Time trajectories of CTAs proportions
Simulation results versus Empirical Data
5.1 The COWCULT model has been partially veriﬁed, and a number of sensitivity analyses have been carried out in order to test its
conceptual internal validity as well as the consistency and logic in the speciﬁcation of all its relevant variables and
relationships.[11] As we have already emphasized, while we have performed the internal validation of the model to check its
theoretical robustness—a necessary and key step in any rigorous modeling exercise- we have encountered several obstacles
for its empirical validation. First, we found surprisingly little empirical data on public perceptions of BSE, especially good long-term
records. In their review of public perceptions on BSE in the UK, Breakwell and Barnett (2001) employ a survey from the Meat and
Livestock Commission—see also FSA (2003)—providing data but only for the years 1990-1998. We have not found any survey
data in which Cultural Theory has been employed to categorize data on risk perceptions. The gathering of adequate data which
allow us to test the empirical validity of the model predictions in a systematic and robust way will constitute the next step and the
subject of future work.
5.2 A comparison of our results with Breakwell and Barnett's (2001) data shows some correspondence between empirical records
and our simulated data on perceptions of risk (see Figure 16). In particular, both series account for a decline in risk perceptions
between summer 1990 and summer 1991, a decrease in autumn 1994 to autumn 1995, an increase in perceptions of risk in
spring 1996, and the subsequent decline after that year. The role of the government's announcement of March 1996 is clearly
witnessed in all the three surveys carried out by Breakwell and Barnett (2001). There are also periods where there is little data
correspondence. For instance, Breakwell and Barnett's survey results do not show the (largely BSE events driven) increase in
risk perceptions between 1992 and 1994. According to our simulation there is also a decrease in perceptions in about late 1996-
1997, driven by a lack of BSE events, whereas the survey shows only a slight decrease after that in 1998. [12]
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Figure 16. Collective perceptions of risk: COWCULT (2008) and Breakwell and Barnett (2001)
5.3 We are aware, as widely recognized in the literature, that 'perceptions' are not always consistently translated into 'behaviors', and
that there is indeed considerable debate about the precise relationship between perception and behavior (Conner et al. 2003;
Sparks and Shepherd 2002). Despite this, in order to establish additional data comparisons which contribute to testing (to some
extent) the existence of a degree of empirical validity of our model, we have examined data on the (de-trended) reduction in the
consumption of beef in the UK provided by Atkinson (1999). We have assumed the existence of a potential correspondence
between periods of relatively high risk perceptions and low levels of beef consumption. Figure 17 shows our simulation results on
collective risk perceptions along with data on beef consumption for the time period considered by Atkinson, i.e. 1988-1998. As the
ﬁgure illustrates there is evidence of some data correspondence between high risk perceptions and low beef consumption
—though in the 1992 to 1993 period consumption seems to remain fairly stable. There is a large reduction in beef consumption
following the March 1996 announcement. This level of beef abstinence does not last for long, however, and beef consumption
picks up again during 1996. This fact is supported by the reduction in risk perceptions shown in COWCULT as long as it is
related to behavioral change and a resumption in beef consumption.
Figure 17. Collective perceptions of risk and beef consumption (Atkinson 1999)
5.4 We have also employed the inverse of the price of beef ('real beef producer prices') as a proxy indicator of the demand for beef
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(see Figure 18). Since increases in the demand for beef involve increase in prices, we have assumed a correspondence
between low beef prices and high levels of perceptions of risk. Figure 18 shows areas of high correspondence between the two
variables, e.g. from 1988- 1991, 1992-1993 and 1996-1997. Less satisfactory is the correspondence during parts of 1991-1992,
parts of 1994 and 1997. The time series ﬁnishes in 1999, at which stage it is just beginning to show a recovery in beef prices.
One might expect beef prices to respond rather sluggishly to changes in perceptions, and this might explain some of the
difference between the COWCULT simulation and the beef price indicator. In conclusion, we have conducted a very partial
testing of the COWCULT model against available empirical data sets and, while the results are reasonably satisfactory, more
original empirical data collection is necessary.
Figure 18. Collective perceptions of risk and beef prices (Atkinson 1999)
Conclusions
6.1 In this paper we have presented a computer based simulation model of the dynamics of the perceptions of risk surrounding
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and new variant Creutzfeld Jacob Disease (nvCJD) in the UK. From a theoretical
viewpoint, simulations have been used to analyze the formation of risk perceptions, and the combined inﬂuence that the media
and the trust that people have in government institutions has in triggering processes of risk ampliﬁcation. The model has been
built drawing on the main concepts and hypotheses of Cultural Theory, employing the categories it identiﬁes (Hierarchy,
Egalitarianism, Individualism and Fatalism) as distinctive forms of cultural bias in the formation of perceptions. As we have
repeatedly argued throughout the study, the relationships and the variables used for the model speciﬁcation are hypothetical and
mainly theory based, since our main aim at this point of the research is the use of our model as a theory development and testing
tool. COWCULT has required that we interpret the perceptions of relevant variables through the interpretative lenses of each
Cultural Theory Archetype for their quantiﬁcation and operationalization. On the other hand, the model equips users with a very
general template that allows them to run simulations employing alternative values of the relevant parameters so as to explore the
dynamics of risk perceptions for different 'cultural scenarios'. Alternative interpretations of different CTAs responses are possible:
since the model is sufﬁciently transparent and easy to apply, any user with different interpretations of the responses of the
deﬁned CTAs could readily modify values and relationships to adapt them to their own interpretations. Since the software
employed in building the model and running the simulations is very user friendly, values of the relevant variables and parameters
can easily be modiﬁed. It is possible, for instance, to run simulations with different degrees of stationarity in the institutional
environment, and to test if changes in government's behavior have the effect on the dynamics of risk that is as postulated by the
relevant theories. From a theoretical point of view, the model provides a quantiﬁcation and operationalisation of relevant
hypotheses and theories in the context of the construction of risks (psychometric analyses, dynamic cultural theory, surprise
theory, information deﬁcit hypothesis, and technical alienation hypothesis) allowing both academics and policy makers to explore
the implications of such theories and concepts in a very user friendly manner. For instance, it is possible to modify the magnitude
of the different feedbacks (information deﬁcit and technical alienation hypotheses) incorporated in the model and the way they
interact in order to investigate the dynamics of risk perceptions for different government response scenarios. The model in
general provides users with a template to explore the inﬂuence of the different variables and relationships driving the formation of
risk perceptions, allowing an analysis of the way in which different hypothesis on media and social communication, and public
trust and reliance affects their dampening or ampliﬁcation. This versatility makes COWCULT a valuable tool to perform 'what if'
analyses and thought experiments contributing to achieving a better understanding of the main factors driving public perceptions
of risk, and the cause-effect relationships among the different parameters and variables involved. These, given the intrinsic
complexity that characterises people's perceptions of risk, are not so easily detected and unravelled empirically. In this respect,
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the work provides a conceptualisation and quantitative operationalisation of the construction of risk perception; a solid theoretical
framework based on well-established theories and a user-friendly analytical tool that can be employed to run simulations for
academic and policy purposes.
6.2 It has to be emphasised, however, that the work presented in this paper constitutes the initial steps along a long research
trajectory. As the model is still in need of empirical validation, at this stage it should be considered an analytical device or generic
template to carry out exploratory analyses and not as a predictive tool. Suitable data sets (not presently available) would be
required in order to provide an improved conﬁrmation of the model's behaviour, and to empirically validate the relationships and
properties of the variables used for its speciﬁcation. Whether it is feasible to collect all the data that would be necessary to
specify the full set of relationships that are required is questionable. The lack of survey or interview data on perceptions of BSE
risks using the categorisation of Cultural Theory constitutes a signiﬁcant obstacle in the model validation. Even if data using CT
categories could be collected now it would not be possible to do so retrospectively for the time period considered in our
simulations, namely 1988 to 2004. We might, however, be able to create 'virtual laboratories' of respondents using the CT
categories, e.g. assembling focus groups consisting of CTA representatives that would be able to provide judgments on the
pattern of the key relationships. Such in depth group work might be supplemented by survey work. In the longer-term COWCULT
could be expanded to look at other risk-issues which were concurrent at the same time as BSE. This would allow an analysis of
the so-called 'risk thermostat' concept of Adams (1995) and help develop a more generic risk model framework that might be
used by stakeholders to explore the possible occurrence of future risk perceptions arising from new technologies, accidents,
threats and media scares.
Notes
1Calibration implies setting the structure of the model and its parameter values in such a way that its results are sufﬁciently close
to empirical observations, with this sufﬁciency criterion depending on the purpose of the model. Calibration thus normally requires
empirical data on the processes that the model is representing. These data can be acquired through surveys, statistical analysis
of empirical data, experiments, questionnaires, etc. (Longley et al. 2009; Sargent 2003).
2This generally accepted deﬁnition implies that risk perceptions cannot be 'wrong', though they can be inaccurately measured.
They may seem to be illogical or irrational but only from someone else's subjective viewpoint.
3An agent based model could have also been used. However, our analysis deliberately avoids reducing agency to individuals.
Indeed, the CT tradition is critical of methodological individualism—the idea that the 'aggregation' of decisions by individuals can
explain broad society-wide developments. We therefore construct our model based on what we called 'cultural archetypes' rather
than to focus on the individual and build a micro-simulation upwards, and, following the sociological tradition of Émile Durkheim
and Mary Douglas, set a group of agents belonging to the same cultural archetype as the unit of analysis.
4Throughout the paper, the terms agent or individuals—interpreting events in constructing their perceptions of risk—refer to an
archetypal representative of each cultural bias, not a speciﬁc or 'real' individual.
5In simulation models of the behaviour of social agents or groups of agents, scaling is a common way of representing variables
that are non-observable and therefore not easily measurable. Quantifying perceptions through scaled variables is also generally
convenient to elaborate surveys for model validation purposes.
6It has to be noted that here we are comparing perceptions of risks associated with the occurrence of events (expected and
actual as calculated by the model) which are culturally-shaped, since, according to CT and social constructionism in general,
evidence is always interpreted differently by each CTA.
7For the sake of simplicity we have assumed that government reliance on S&T information increases as public research
spending grows.
8As previously indicated, the model accounts for movements of individuals between CTAs so these proportions vary accordingly
over time.
9Since the number of nvCDJ events is signiﬁcantly lower than that of BSE cases, the values of the corresponding variable in the
y axis of Figure 8 are represented in a different scale so that both series can be visually compared. For this reason in this scale
from 0-1000 cases (which allows the representation of the highest number of cases for the BSE events variable) the values in
the axis for nvCDJ events appear as close to 0.
10Again different scales have been used to represent the values of these three variables in order to allow the reader to compare
their dynamics in a more user friendly visual manner. The values on the y axis however show the real numbers for each variable
so that actual values can be clearly distinguished. This is the case in all ﬁgures presented to support our discussion of the
simulation results of the model in the remaining of this section.
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11These along with a software copy of the model and its program code can be provided by the authors under request.
12It is likely that part of the mismatch between our model results and these data is due to typical survey inadequacies. However it
is not possible for us to assess to what extent this is the case.
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